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Abstract  
Evidence supporting the effects of mergers in health care 
markets on quality is mixed. In this study we exploit a 
government policy in NSW that imposed mergers on area health 
services (AHS) to evaluate the effects of the merger on 
patient waiting times, an indicator of quality. We focus on 
the specific question of whether the merger had a larger 
impact on less-well performing AHSs. Our results show 
heterogeneous impacts, reducing waiting times for relatively 
urgent public patients but further delaying non urgent 
patients. In addition, we find the merger reduced the waiting 
time gap between public and private patients. 
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Faced with increasingly tight health budgets, entities in many 
health markets reorganize to improve efficiency. There have 
been consolidations of hospitals, private health insurers, 
HMOs, local health networks and primary care providers (see 
Shaw 2003; Cuellar and Gertler 2003). One outcome of 
consolidation can be a reduction in the quality of care for 
patients in some or all of the entities involved. 
Consolidation may even adversely affect access to care to 
potential patients (Hammer and Sage, 2003). Others focus on 
law and regulations and the predictors of merger or 
acquisition (see Feldman et al. 1996; Town et al 2007) or the 
impact of the consolidation on prices (see Connor et al 1997; 
Town et al 2006). Other studies examining the impact of the 
consolidation on measures of quality of care have been based 
on hospital mergers and mortality among the hospitalized 
population (Hayford, 2012; Gaynor and Town, 2013). In general, 
these studies find that hospital mergers improve quality. 
However this conclusion is often based on a single, or a small 
number of hospitals, or relies on the management of specific 
conditions, such as heart attack, or patients at the end of 
their lives, so it may not generalize to the wider population. 
In addition, most of this empirical evidence comes from 
private hospitals in the US which has a very distinctive 
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health system. Gaynor et al (2012), Azevedo and Mateus (2013) 
and Bloom et al (2013) are among the few studies that have 
analyzed the impacts of hospital mergers in public systems.
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The results are mixed. In the UK, Gaynor et al (2012) do not 
find that merger increases quality (measured by death rates 
from emergency heart attack (AMI) admissions and length of 
stay) while Bloom et al (2013) find a positive merger impact 
on management quality. In Portugal, Azevedo and Mateus (2013) 
find that instead of lowering costs, post-merger costs are 
higher. 
To credibly estimate the impacts of a merger is challenging 
because the entities which choose to merge have distinctly 
different characteristics compared with the non-merging 
entities. Although some of these characteristics can be 
observed, some others may not, creating selection bias when we 
compare, for example, the health outcomes of patients or 
consumers of merging and non-merging entities. If the merging 
entities also tend to be those which provide high quality of 
care, then we may misleadingly attribute better care to the 
merger. It is also possible that the true effect of the merger 
is negative but it is counteracted by the positive effect of 
the inherent features of the merging entities on quality of 
care. If a merger can be randomly imposed on entities, then we 
                                                          
1 Related studies that look at the impact of competition per se (e.g., 
variation in hospital concentration across areas or increased choice of 
hospital) include Propper et al (2008), Propper et al (2004), Gaynor et al 
(2011) and Cooper et al (2011). 
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do not have to worry about selection bias. However, there are 
few real-life experiments involving randomized mergers.  
In this study, we exploit a government policy in New South 
Wales (NSW) in 2005 that imposed mergers on pairs (or trios in 
some cases) of adjacent area health services (AHS) to examine 
how a merger in the health sector may have impacted quality of 
care. Figure 1 illustrates the amalgamation of the 17 AHSs in 
NSW to 8 larger AHSs; the dark thick lines show the AHS 
boundaries after the amalgamation. As the measure of quality 
we use patient waiting times for non-emergency or elective 
surgeries. Longer waiting times not only cause prolonged 
suffering to patients (Oudhoff et al, 2007; Hodge et al, 
2007), but may also indicate inefficiency and administrative 
weaknesses of the health system (Siciliani et al 2013). In 
settings where elective surgeries are provided free of charge, 
demand is rationed by waiting times, prioritized by urgency. 
In Australia there are three categories of urgency: urgent to 
be admitted within 30 days, semi-urgent within 90 days and 
non-urgent within 365 days.  
[Insert Figure 1] 
The amalgamation aimed to significantly reduce administrative 
costs, which had grown by over 50% in 5 years. Before the 
merge each AHS acted like a private entity, governed by a 
Health Board and run by a Chief Executive Officer. After the 
merger, the Health Boards were dissolved and replaced with a 
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Health Advisory Council made up of clinicians and community 
representatives. They were charged with achieving an 
allocation of health resources more aligned with the needs of 
the community. The AHS amalgamation was expected to improve 
equity through redistribution of health workforce and also to 
improve the image of the overall NSW health system that had 
often been criticized for delivering poor quality health care, 
indicated in particular by long waiting times for free 
elective surgery in public hospitals.  
The amalgamation affects all AHSs in NSW so we focus on the 
specific question of whether the AHS amalgamation had a larger 
impact on less-well performing AHSs prior to the merger. We 
contribute to existing knowledge of the link between quality 
and merger in the health sector in four significant ways: (1) 
as the amalgamation is forced, our setting avoids selection 
biases associated with voluntary mergers; (2) we use a patient 
health-related outcome that is not restricted to a particular 
hospital or disease; (3) we explore the merger effects over 
time; and (4) we investigate possibly heterogeneous impacts of 
the merger on equity of access related to patient payment 
status.   
 
 
II.  Data and methods 
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NSW has over half a million hospital admissions annually from 
waiting lists. Our data is derived from the Waiting List Data 
Collection database consisting of all admissions from waiting 
lists to NSW public hospitals from July 2004 to December 2010. 
At the start of the study period, there were 108 public 
hospitals in the data, and this number remains roughly the 
same by the end of the study period. We focus on patients who 
were NSW residents and were not admitted with special group 
status such as Veteran’s Affair or Workers’ Compensation 
(3.1%). We have 1,735,715 observations. The mean patient age 
is 52 and 53% are female. The outcome variable, waiting time, 
is defined as the time between being placed on the waiting 
list by a treating specialist and admission to hospital. 
Within a merged pair we define the “underperformer” as the AHS 
with longer average waiting time before the amalgamation 
within their respective pair. Figure 2 shows the distribution 
of the pre-merger waiting time in each of the 8 amalgamated 
AHS pairs. Pairs 3, 5 and 8 involve the amalgamation of 3 
AHSs. In pair 1, AHS B (dashed line) has many more cases of 
patients waiting longer than 100 days than AHS A, resulting in 
longer average waiting time. So, for pair 1, AHS B is the 
underperformer. Likewise, AHS B is the underperformer in pairs 
3 to 6, AHS A is the underperformer in pairs 2 and 7 and AHS C 
is the underperformer in pair 8. 
[Insert Figure 2] 
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To estimate the impact of the amalgamation, we take advantage 
of the panel nature of the data to compare waiting times in 
the under performing and better performing AHSs, taking into 
account differences between them before the merger. Because 
the underperformers initially have longer average waiting 
time, a positive merger effect arises from convergence towards 
the better performers’ waiting time or an even shorter waiting 
time than that of the better performing AHSs. Because we 
observe these AHSs for quite a number of years post treatment, 
we can study the time path of the merger effect.  
Specifically, we estimate the following equation: 
itittittit XTDTy   )( , 
where  is the waiting time of patient  in time 
,  is a vector of dummy variables for year, 0T  is the 
pre-merger period,  is a dummy variable for underperformers, 
 is a vector of age, sex, procedure and hospital peer group 
fixed effects, and  is a random error term. The use of year 
dummies allows the merger effects to vary over time. Non-
linear trend effects may arise from short-run adjustment 
constraints or administrative diseconomies of scale in later 
years. The addition of the  vector controls for changes in 
severity of patients or case mix over time, as well as 
hospital peer effects.  
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We estimate the model using Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
separately for urgent, semi-urgent and non-urgent urgency 
admissions.
2
 This conditioning accounts for the fact that some 
procedures are more likely to be assigned to one urgency 
category than others (e.g., cardiac catheterization is almost 
never assigned to the non-urgent category). In addition, we 
distinguish paying (or private) patients from public patients. 
In NSW public hospitals, patients can be admitted as public or 
private patients. Public patients are treated without charge 
whilst private patients incur hospital and medical charges in 
exchange for choice of doctor and possibly a better standard 
of accommodation. The revenue that a public hospital receives 
from admitting private patients is additional to the (fixed) 
revenue derived from government payments. As well, private 
patients are a source of fees for the treating specialists, 
giving incentives for hospitals and specialists to expedite 
private patient admissions in public hospitals (Johar and 
Savage 2012). The share of private patients is lower in 
underperforming AHSs, about 7%, than in the better performing 
AHSs, about 20%, but we find that these shares remain stable 
over the study period, suggesting that the AHS mergers had 
little impact on the mix of paying and non-paying patients in 
public hospitals. The standard errors of estimates are 
                                                          
2 Waiting times have a long right tail. By conditioning on urgency 
categories, the waiting time distribution is more normally distributed 
around the conditional (on urgency category) mean. OLS on the true scale is 
preferred to a logarithmic transformation because of problems with re-
transformation, interpretation and inference.    
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clustered at the hospital-level to account for correlation 
between patients within a hospital.  
We conduct several sensitivity tests. The first test concerns 
the use of the median or the proportion of waiting beyond the 
recommended time, rather than the average, to define 
underperformers. Both alternative measures change the 
definition of the underperforming AHS in only 1 of the 8 
pairings. The second test concerns the sensitivity of the 
results to time of year. We explore this by restricting the 
data to only the second half of each year. Third, we test the 
merger effect against a related policy change at around the 
same time. One year after the AHS amalgamation, the NSW 
Department of Health released the Advice for Referring & 
Treating Doctors - Managing Elective Patients/ Waiting Lists, 
which contains recommendations for doctors in assigning the 
urgency category for 164 elective procedures.
3
 The guideline is 
not mandatory. We can use this to test the merger effect 
because, while the AHS amalgamation affects all patients, only 
those undergoing the selected procedures are covered by the 
guideline. We test for the merger effect within the subsample 
of procedures that are not covered by the guideline.  
 
 
                                                          
3
 The guideline, released in April 2006, assigned selected procedures to at least one urgency 





First, in Figure 3 we plot the unconditional (raw) mean 
waiting times before (time 0) and after the AHS amalgamation 
by urgency category. It shows that in all urgency categories 
private patients have much shorter waiting times than public 
patients. As expected, at time = 0, waiting times are 
substantially longer for underperformers, especially for 
public patients. Post-merger, waiting times for urgent and 
semi-urgent public patients in underperforming AHSs reduce 
sharply, whilst the waiting times of private patients 
generally increase. Regardless of payment status, non-urgent 
patients experienced longer delays in being admitted. 
[Insert Figure 3] 
Table 1 reports the effect of the merger, controlling for 
differences in other patient and hospital characteristics.
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Starting with the waiting time of the most urgent patients, we 
find a positive merger effect only for public patients. Pre-
merger public patients in underperforming AHSs wait 12.5 days 
longer than their counterparts but after three years, this gap 
narrows to 2 days and subsequently disappears. The same cannot 
be said for private urgent patients. Initially, they wait 
about the same time but post-merger private patients in 
underperforming AHSs wait 3-6 days longer than their private 
                                                          
4 Because there are hundreds of covariates, for conciseness we do not 
report the estimates of . 
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counterparts. For semi-urgent patients, the merger also 
benefits public patients. By the end of the study period, the 
merger had eliminated the public waiting time gap between AHSs 
which had been over 30 days pre-merger. In contrast, for semi-
urgent private patients in underperforming AHSs, although 
there is a small reduction in the waiting time gap, by six 
years post-merger they still wait 20 days longer than their 
counterparts in better performing AHSs. Finally for the non-
urgent patients, the merger had unfavourable impacts on both 
public and private patients. In the last two years of the 
study period, admissions of non-urgent public patients in 
underperforming AHSs were delayed by over 40 days compared 
with their counterparts in the better performing AHSs, and for 
non-urgent private patients, this gap is 90 days.  
 [Insert Table 1] 
In Table 2 we present results from the sensitivity analyses 
split by public and private patients. The sizes of the merger 
effects vary from those in Table 1 but they show a consistent 
pattern., Column [1] uses the alternative definition of 
underperformers (median or proportion of overdue admissions). 
Either modification affects only one AHS pair so it is not 
surprising that the results are very close to those in Table 
1. Column [2] uses only admissions in the second half of each 
year. The results confirm that our main results are not driven 
by within-year demand fluctuations in admissions. Results 
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presented in Column [3] use only patients whose procedures are 
unaffected by the contemporaneous release of the NSW clinical 
priority guideline, which may otherwise confound the merger 
effect. They show estimated merger effects that are quite 
close to those in Table 1 suggesting that our main results are 
not driven by the guideline policy.  
 [Insert Table 2] 
 
IV. Discussion 
Our results show that following merger, the merged entities 
re-prioritized, producing heterogeneous impacts. Specifically, 
it improved access for relatively urgent (urgent and semi-
urgent) public patients, who make up 60% of all admissions, 
and it also had equity implications, reducing the waiting time 
gap between public and private patients. While the waiting 
time gaps for urgent and semi-urgent public patients 
dramatically diminish, their private counterparts experience 
an increase in waiting time gap or a small reduction in 
waiting time gap. As suggested by Figure 3, this contrasting 
pattern implies a convergence of the waiting times of urgent 
and semi-urgent public patients to those of their private 
patient counterparts. In addition, post-merger delays in non-
urgent admissions are larger for private patients which imply 
a convergence of the non-urgent public and private patients’ 
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waiting times as well. As improved equity was one of the goals 
of the amalgamation, this is a positive result.  
We find that the positive merger effects were achieved in a 
relatively short period (2-3 years). To determine that the 
positive merger effects are not driven by patients leaving 
public waiting lists, we check throughput over the period. 
Table 3 shows that, for both public and private patients, 
throughput has stayed largely stable, suggesting that the 
merger did not discourage demand for elective procedures in 
public hospitals. The public-patient share also remains stable 
over time, suggesting that private patients did not leave the 
public sector due to longer waiting times.  
[Insert Table 3] 
Our analysis suggests that the majority of patients were 
better off as a result of the merger. Although non-urgent 
patients, who already faced long waiting periods, were further 
delayed and private patients lost their advantage, for the 
bulk of those who were made worse off, waiting times remained 
within the recommended clinical time.  
A relevant question is how the re-prioritization occurred? The 
assignment of urgency category is clearly one of the main 
mechanisms to influence waiting times. In the absence of a 
formal or mandatory prioritization rule (Curtis et al 2010), 
providers can manipulate urgency assignment. For example, 
treating specialists can expedite admissions by assigning 
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patients to a higher urgency category. This problem may be 
exacerbated by policies that target urgent admissions, notably 
the federal government’s Elective Surgery Waiting List 
Reduction Plan (ESWLRP)
5
 announced in 2008. The plan provided 
funding increases to states that achieved certain performance 
measures, one being a reduction in overdue admissions (i.e., 
those exceeding the recommended waiting time). Such a policy 
may encourage assignments to less urgent categories because 
target admission periods are longer. This may provide an 
incentive for underperformers to manipulate the urgency 
assignment to a larger extent than others.  
To investigate this, we estimate a multinomial logit of 
urgency category and report the risk ratios of an assignment 
to a less urgent category relative to the assignment to the 
most urgent category. Table 4 reports the relative risk ratios 
of the time trends and their interactions with the indicator 
variable for underperformers. The time trends pick up an 
increasing number of both public and private patients being 
assigned as less urgent over time but there is lack of 
evidence that the underperformers are doing it more. The 
results in Table 4 also suggest that the waiting time 
improvement in Table 1 for underperformers arises from better 
administrative and management systems, rather than being 
driven by a manipulative behaviour of health providers to 







attract additional funding. For private patients in 
underperforming AHSs, the merger actually decreased the 
probability of being assigned to less urgent categories, which 
may partly explain the increased waiting time gap for urgent 
private patients (Table 1). 
[Insert Table 4] 
Our finding of heterogeneous merger impacts highlights the 
importance of going beyond evaluating a policy by the overall 
impact, which can mask large effects in opposite directions as 
is the case here. The next lesson from our results is that a 
positive shock to a system can bring about an immediate large 
improvement. This is perhaps why entities merge in the first 
place, to “fix things”. While making a convincing statement 
about long-run effects of a merger is beyond the scope of this 
paper, our results do suggest that mergers can result in 
sustained improvements for some years. By restructuring 
administration, mergers can interrupt the routine practices of 
the previous system. In our case, this is illustrated by the 
diminishing preferential treatment of paying patients on the 
waiting lists. The equity implication of the result is 
compelling. Opponents of mergers have argued that mergers 
increase inequity, for example through adverse selection (Town 
et al 2007).  
A widespread view among health policymakers is that mergers 
often harm consumers by raising prices without producing an 
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accompanying increase in quality (Cuellar and Gertler 2005). 
Overall, our results indicate that mergers in the health 
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Table 1: The effect of AHS amalgamation on waiting time 












 Urgent  Semi-urgent Non-urgent Urgent  Semi-urgent Non-urgent 
  b se b se b se b se b se b se 
T 1 1.937*** (0.583) 8.341*** (2.486) 16.967** (6.749) -0.087 (0.653) 3.352* (1.955) 3.12 (3.902) 
T 2 -0.279 (1.075) 3.823 (2.736) -15.194* (8.698) -2.345** (1.178) 1.726 (2.466) -6.689 (6.048) 
T 3 -6.156*** (1.342) -4.259 (3.882) -27.310** (10.710) -4.650*** (1.437) -0.764 (2.418) -7.159 (4.744) 
T 4 -7.590*** (1.474) -7.645** (3.836) -16.810* (10.057) -4.934*** (1.338) -1.083 (2.827) -4.688 (5.030) 
T 5 -6.739*** (1.459) -13.456*** (4.619) -6.883 (9.912) -4.517*** (1.265) -2.282 (3.002) -2.199 (6.436) 
T 6 -6.394*** (1.367) -12.634*** (4.650) 14.293 (10.535) -4.291*** (1.495) -0.968 (3.115) 9.195 (7.908) 
D  x T 0 12.473*** (3.785) 34.232*** (8.099) 23.334 (17.087) 2.168 (2.353) 27.572*** (9.155) 15.085* (7.865) 
D  x T 1 12.352*** (4.096) 36.456*** (9.051) 35.384** (14.781) 1.329 (2.009) 10.645 (7.672) 6.004 (8.318) 
D  x T 2 6.271** (2.992) 25.912*** (6.472) 25.933** (12.141) 4.101** (1.713) 17.184*** (4.557) 5.686 (7.701) 
D  x T 3 1.964** (0.989) 16.916*** (5.682) 27.629** (12.271) 2.988*** (0.928) 14.942*** (4.247) 34.165*** (9.256) 
D  x T 4 1.19 (0.968) 15.019*** (5.407) 27.380** (11.683) 3.263*** (0.756) 20.031*** (5.353) 42.266*** (10.502) 
D  x T 5 0.931 (1.188) 8.718* (4.997) 40.395*** (12.447) 4.611*** (1.636) 19.446*** (5.329) 85.820*** (18.168) 
D  x T 6 0.934 (1.447) 7.436 (4.812) 44.917*** (14.110) 5.916*** (2.012) 22.104*** (7.158) 89.567*** (15.957) 
N 556,770   488,948   458,532   121,485   66,579   43,401   
R-squared 0.144   0.128   0.209   0.106   0.0931   0.148   
Note: these results are based on linear regression separately for each urgency status. Included in the model are controls for patient 
demographics, procedures and hospital peer. Standard errors are clustered at hospital-level. *, ** and *** denotes statistical significance at 
10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. The p-values for F-statistics under the null of all coefficients are zero are 0 in all models. 
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Table 2: Sensitivity analyses  
 Public Private 
  [1]   [2]  [3]   [1]   [2]  [3]   
 Median  Half year  Procedure  Median  Half year  Procedure  
  b se b se b se b se b se b se 
Urgent                   
D  x T 0 12.848*** (3.735) 12.571*** (3.840) 10.624** (4.072) 2.431 (2.295) 2.209 (2.365) 1.833 (2.393) 
D  x T 1 12.915*** (4.016) 11.214*** (3.628) 9.399** (4.123) 3.016 (2.180) 2.4 (2.415) 1.368 (2.356) 
D  x T 2 6.155** (2.953) 4.741** (2.334) 4.265 (2.820) 4.146** (1.700) 2.731* (1.496) 3.892** (1.857) 
D  x T 3 1.634* (0.969) 0.845 (0.843) 0.788 (1.028) 3.363*** (0.932) 2.885*** (0.901) 3.330*** (1.244) 
D  x T 4 1.043 (0.846) 0.965 (0.984) 0.165 (1.030) 3.891*** (0.753) 3.102*** (0.793) 3.799*** (0.987) 
D  x T 5 0.573 (1.033) 1.112 (1.166) 0.414 (1.283) 5.047*** (1.527) 3.739*** (1.157) 4.815** (1.918) 
D  x T 6 0.677 (1.301) 1.163 (1.508) 0.024 (1.728) 6.080*** (1.831) 6.535*** (2.348) 4.757*** (1.535) 
Semi-urgent             
D  x T 0 33.863*** (8.213) 34.373*** (8.131) 34.705*** (9.085) 17.811*** (6.458) 27.385*** (9.235) 28.218* (15.007) 
D  x T 1 37.010*** (8.978) 34.482*** (9.081) 34.493*** (9.162) 20.897*** (7.479) 5.247 (7.214) 7.816 (9.601) 
D  x T 2 25.289*** (6.413) 24.713*** (6.089) 24.858*** (6.797) 21.516*** (4.442) 17.596*** (4.705) 18.448*** (6.092) 
D  x T 3 15.493*** (5.631) 15.405*** (5.815) 16.736*** (5.360) 19.401*** (3.821) 16.378*** (4.369) 13.258*** (4.856) 
D  x T 4 13.872** (5.454) 12.035** (5.192) 13.757** (5.379) 22.151*** (5.426) 15.995*** (5.210) 17.252*** (5.548) 
D  x T 5 7.578 (4.631) 8.987* (4.974) 9.938* (5.083) 22.721*** (5.740) 21.046*** (6.237) 20.436*** (5.910) 
D  x T 6 8.113* (4.735) 6.934 (4.467) 6.553 (5.339) 24.873*** (6.603) 21.435*** (7.780) 21.134** (8.372) 
Non-urgent             
D  x T 0 27.617 (16.768) 23.004 (17.130) 22.639 (14.902) 18.553* (9.375) 14.661* (7.842) -6.532 (10.294) 
D  x T 1 27.124* (14.539) 35.582** (13.824) 27.12 (17.820) 9.339 (8.478) 13.791 (9.207) -6.572 (9.136) 
D  x T 2 21.763* (11.702) 27.915** (11.712) 20.171* (12.077) 15.838* (9.237) 14.001* (8.357) -8.475 (7.804) 
D  x T 3 24.871** (11.858) 26.465** (12.750) 34.941*** (12.390) 34.150*** (8.746) 32.432*** (10.107) 28.104** (12.750) 
D  x T 4 28.696** (11.655) 26.119** (11.951) 29.916** (14.589) 48.968*** (11.175) 41.558*** (9.004) 34.245** (14.668) 
D  x T 5 37.745*** (12.177) 44.604*** (13.148) 39.138** (15.491) 79.700*** (20.336) 93.383*** (18.034) 89.281*** (27.229) 
D  x T 6 40.986*** (14.151) 48.240*** (15.081) 36.582* (20.462) 82.735*** (17.089) 87.768*** (17.362) 78.892*** (26.421) 
Note: these results are based on linear regression separately for each urgency status. Included in the model are controls for patient 
demographics, procedures and hospital peer. Standard errors are clustered at hospital-level. *, ** and *** denotes statistical significance at 




Table 3: Throughput by AHS pairing 
    Short AHS    Long AHS     
Time Overall Public Private Total Public Private Total 
0 141,868 83,170 16,786 99,956 39,434 2,478 41,912 
1 280,711 161,892 31,375 193,267 82,156 5,288 87,444 
2 271,119 154,401 28,902 183,303 82,268 5,548 87,816 
3 262,639 151,095 29,660 180,755 76,216 5,668 81,884 
4 261,833 150,415 29,313 179,728 76,069 6,036 82,105 
5 249,654 143,490 28,834 172,324 71,731 5,599 77,330 





Table 4: Relative risk ratios from multinomial logit model of 
urgency category 




  b se b se 
Semi-urgent    
T 1 1.002 (0.058) 0.969 (0.102) 
T 2 1.244* (0.138) 1.299 (0.235) 
T 3 1.728*** (0.220) 1.749*** (0.365) 
T 4 1.884*** (0.293) 1.968*** (0.469) 
T 5 1.780*** (0.294) 1.794** (0.488) 
T 6 1.854*** (0.304) 1.920** (0.547) 
D  x T 0 0.906 (0.136) 1.117 (0.286) 
D  x T 1 0.931 (0.122) 1.074 (0.214) 
D  x T 2 0.888 (0.103) 0.691* (0.132) 
D  x T 3 0.888 (0.083) 0.767* (0.121) 
D  x T 4 0.947 (0.095) 0.733** (0.113) 
D  x T 5 1.031 (0.111) 0.698 (0.167) 
D  x T 6 1.112 (0.126) 0.696* (0.146) 
Non-urgent     
T 1 0.968 (0.047) 0.913 (0.064) 
T 2 1.464*** (0.168) 1.543** (0.277) 
T 3 2.391*** (0.355) 3.115*** (1.227) 
T 4 2.600*** (0.373) 3.466*** (1.063) 
T 5 3.066*** (0.474) 3.667*** (1.055) 
T 6 3.120*** (0.501) 3.193*** (0.901) 
D  x T 0 1.271 (0.304) 2.092** (0.673) 
D  x T 1 1.342 (0.294) 2.145** (0.757) 
D  x T 2 1.013 (0.216) 1.254 (0.462) 
D  x T 3 0.883 (0.175) 0.653 (0.326) 
D  x T 4 1.222 (0.168) 0.600 (0.231) 
D  x T 5 1.240 (0.163) 0.486** (0.163) 
D  x T 6 1.343** (0.184) 0.597* (0.180) 
Note: these results are based on multinomial logit models separately for public and private 
patients. The reference group is urgent category. Standard errors are clustered at hospital-
level. *, ** and *** denotes statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
Included in the model are controls for patient demographics, procedures and hospital peer. 
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Figure 2: Distribution of waiting time prior to AHS 
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Note: waiting times beyond 100 days are top-coded to get a clearer picture of the 
distribution of the bulk of waiting time cases under 100 days. The sub-headings 
indicate the 8 AHS pairings after amalgamation. Each sub-graph plots the waiting 
time distribution in the original AHS (prior to pairing), differentiated by A, B 
and C, in the case where there are three merging AHSs. 
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Sources: Authors’ analyses of the 2004-2010 Waiting List Data Collection data by NSW Health. 
The y-axis is waiting days and the x-axis is time. Time=0 is 2004, pre AHS amalgamation. Time= 
1 to 6 indicates 6 years of post AHS amalgamation period. 
 
